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TRANSPORTATION REGULATION AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE
C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMSt
GOVERNMENT reorganization is in the air. In recent years President Tru-
man submitted to Congress numerous plans in accordance with powers
granted him by the Reorganization Act of 19491 and, generally, with the
recommendations of the Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch.
of which former President Hoover was chairman. Congress approved most of
these plans. In February of this year President Eisenhower appointed a new
Committee on Organization headed by Nelson Rockefeller. And in an act
signed by the President on February 11, Congress renewed for two years the
President's reorganization powers.-
Among the more interesting reorganization proposals is that made by Dr.
Samuel P. Huntington in his recent article in this JouRNAL, "The Marasmus
of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest."3
After criticizing the Commission adversely, Dr. Huntington offers as a solu-
tion the abolition of the Commission and the transfer of its powers to three
separate commissions dealing respectively with rail, water, and highway trans-
portation, all to be within the Department of Commerce and subject to the
policy guidance of the Secretary of Commerce. Dr. Huntington indicates his
expectation that the Secretary of Commerce, whose duties are manifold, would
rely in the discharge of this responsibility largely on the advice of the Under
Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, an office created by Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 21 of 1950, hereinafter referred to as "Plan 21."-1
Basically what Dr. Huntington would do is to substitute: (1) an agency
of the executive branch for a quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial body; (2) a
single policy-making officer for a group of officers; and (3) an officer whose
tenure is at the pleasure of the President of the United States for officers with
tenure established by law and who, in practice, hold office for rather long
terms.
The validity of Dr. Huntington's criticism of the Commission has been
analyzed by Dr. Charles S. Morgan of the Commission staff.n The purpose
tMember, Nevw York Bar; formerly General Counsel, United States Department of
Commerce.
1. 63 STAT. 203 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 133z (Supp. 1952).
2. Pub. L No. 3, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 11, 1953).
3. 61 YALE UJ. 467 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Huntington). Dr. Huntington's pro-
posed reorganization is found id. at 503-09.
4. 64 STAT. 1273 (1950), 46 U.S.C. § 1111 note (Supp. 1952).
5. A Critique of "Tw Mara-m..r of the ICC: The Commission, the Railreads, ard
the Public Interest," 62 YALE UJ. 171 (Jan., 1953). The author is Chief Carrier Analyst,
Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, ICC.
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here is to comment on the remedy proposed by Dr. Huntington. It is a pro-
posal of a kind made from time to time and on each occasion supported by
the same general arguments. The present writer will draw on his observations
as General Counsel of the Department of Commerce for the past two years.
Plan 21 as a Precedent
Dr. Huntington finds a "pattern" for his proposal in the "recent reorgani-
zation of the Maritime Commission. .".."0 His three commissions should be,
he says, "in a position similar to that of the Maritime Board and subject to
the same policy guidance of the Secretary."
7
"Placing the separate commissions in the Department of Commerce
would remove the need for an appellate commission since it would
be up to the Secretary to define general transportation policies and
to resolve differences among the commissions .... The logic of the
situation requires the unification of all transportation policy respon-
sibility in the Department of Commerce." s
The "recent reorganization" to which Dr. Huntington refers is that effected
by Plan 21. The Maritime Commission was thereby abolished. Its adminis-
trative duties were transferred to the Maritime Administration, its regula-
tory and subsidy powers to the Federal Maritime Board. Both were placed
within the Department of Commerce. 9
The aptness of the analogy between the reorganization proposed by Dr.
Huntington and that accomplished by Plan 21, his use of the words "pattern,"
"same," and "similar," his implication that what he wants is merely that the
Department of Commerce do more of what it is doing now, are very much
open to question.
Preliminarily, we may note a difference in the Secretary's area of policy
responsibility. No limit is specified by Dr. Huntington. But according to the
explanatory message of the President of March 13, 1950, accompanying the
submission of Plan 21 to Congress, the Secretary's function is "over-all trans-
portation policy within the executive branch."10 The use of the expression
"within the executive branch" made clear the intention of the President in
no way to supersede or interfere with the authority of Congress and the regu-
latory agencies with respect to transportation policy.
The omission of any such limiting phrase from Dr. Huntington's recom-
mendation may or may not be of significance. In another context such a
limitation might be regarded as something that "goes without saying." Never-
6. Huntington, p. 508.
7. Id. at pp. 508-09 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at p. 509 n.185.
9. As already mentioned, the Plan also created the office of Under Secretary of Com-
merce for Transportation.
10. H.R. Doc. No. 526, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950) (emphasis added).
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theless, in an article urging a large expansion of the Secretary's powers,
more precision would have been welcome.
A more important discrepancy between the maritime reorganization and Dr.
Huntington's proposal is found in the express provision of Plan 21 (Section
106), that in the exercise of its regulatory functions the Federal Maritime
Board shall be "independent of the Secretary of Commerce."' 1 This provision
was stressed in the explanatory message of the President. But it is against
the ICC's exercise of regulatory functions that Dr. Huntington so bitterly
and so extensively complains, and it is the supervision of those functions that
he proposes to assign to the Secretary.
It is true that in the exercise of its subsidy functions the Board, under Plan
21, is to "be guided by the general policies of the Secretary of Commerce"
(Section 107). Presumably it is this provision which has led Dr. Huntington
to the apparent belief that the Secretary is already acting as an appellate tri-
bunal. But Section 105(1) of Plan 21 e-xpressly provides that the action of
the Board in subsidy matters "shall be final." And in his testimony before
Congress at the hearings when Plan 21 was under consideration, Secretary
Sawyer forcefully and unequivocally repudiated the thought that the Secretary
of Commerce would thereby be authorized to review the Board's action in sub-
sidy matters.'- In fact, at these hearings all that the policy guidance seemed
to amount to was that the Board, in awvarding subsidies, would act within the
scope of the trade routes determined by the Secretary under Section 211 of
the Merchant 1arine Act, 1936.13
Ir. Sawyer, a most energetic public officer, was Secretary of Commerce
from the effective date of Plan 21, May 24, 1950, until his retirement on
January 20, 1953, upon the change in administration. During that period
of almost three years he did not adopt a single "policy," if we conceive of
policy, as Dr. Huntington seems to, as a principle in the nature of a statute
or directive to control the actions of the Board. He made no change in the
trade routes previously established by the Maritime Commission. In fact,
his only public activity in the field of maritime subsidy was his vigorous op-
position to the demand of the Comptroller General that the government re-
11. Huntington, p. 467 rL1, classifying the Federal Maritime Board as an agency
"primarily engaged in the regulation of carriers" and locating it within the Department
of Commerce, is therefore only technically accurate. In the respect with which Dr. Hunt-
ington is concerned, vi., regulation, it is, in effect, outside the Department.
12. Hearings before Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Execrtiz Depart-
ments on S. Res. 265, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). Secretary Sawyer testified in part:
"I should like to make it clear that under the plan the Secretary has rp authority either
to award a subsidy or to direct the action of the Board on a subsidy applicatin." Id. at
41. "[The Secretary of Commerce] cannot only not override [the Board] ; he cannot direct
them in the first place." Id. at 44. The discussion of trade routes is found U. at 40. Despitu
these disclaimers, Plan 21 lays a foundation for Commerce Department e.'tralegal influ-
ence over the FMB as developed at page 571 infra, an influence v,hich Svcrdary Sav.yr
did not exert.
13. 49 STAT. 1989 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1121 (1946). See Hearings, stpra note 12.
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pudiate the construction differential subsidy contract for the S.S. United
States.1
4
In conclusion, Dr. Huntington's seeming intimation that all he is propos-
ing is that the Secretary and Department of Commerce do more of what they
are already doing cannot be accepted. His proposal should be recognized for
what it is, a novel and drastic reorganization of transportation regulation.
That of course is not a reason for its rejection. Let us consider it on its
merits.
Theoretical and Practical Difficulties with Commerce Department Regulation
Perhaps the most arresting feature of Dr. Huntington's proposal is its
aggrandizement of the executive branch. As already noted, Dr. Huntington is
somewhat vague in his use of the words "transportation policy." Presumably,
he does not deny that rate-making and regulation are legislative in character.
He does not, we must assume, propose that Congress abdicate its powers,
but rather that the delegation of them run to the executive branch instead of
to the ICC as at present. It would thus be only such questions of policy as
arise in the course of the exercise of these delegated powers that the Depart-
ment of Commerce would decide.
It is to be recognized that this would probably not be unconstitutional.
Much, if not most, congressional delegation is to the executive branch.
The executive exercise of quasi-legislative powers has frequently been sus-
tained.15 It is true that the most extreme examples are in the field of foreign
affairs, an area deemed a special province of the President.10 However, in
Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States 17 the Supreme Court sustained the
delegation to the Secretary of Commerce of the power to regulate rates under
the Shipping Act of 1916, a power previously vested in the Shipping Board. The
rates involved were inter-coastal. The only apparent distinction between the
delegation at issue in Swayne & Hoyt and that proposed by Dr. Huntington
is one of degree.'
8
14. Letter to Hon. John F. Shelley, Chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives, in Department of Com-
merce News Release, June 23, 1952.
15. E.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1891); Buttfield v. Strana-
han, 192 U.S. 470 (1904); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907);
United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
16. See United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) ; Chicago
& So. A.L. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Pan American Airways v.
CAB, 121 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941) (the two latter cases uphold the authority of the Presi-
dent over foreign air certificates provided in § 801 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 STAT,
973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 199 (1946), an authority distinctly legislative in character).
17. 300 U.S. 297 (1937).
18. One is inclined to wonder why Dr. Huntington did not choose as his "pattern"
the seemingly more similar delegation of regulatory functions to the Secretary of Com-
merce effected by § 12 of Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933), rather than "the recent
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Assuming, therefore, that the grant can be validly effected, should the De-
partment of Commerce have such powers? The answer to this question in-
volves serious problems of government organization.
In the first place, it is contrary to the theory of the separation of powers for
the legislative body to delegate its functions to the executive branch if not
clearly necessary. It is to be remembered that the original Act to Regulate
Commerce to some extent placed: the ICC within the Department of the In-
terior,19 but the Commission was made wholly independent soon thereafter. -°
At one time the Comptroller of the Treasury, an officer of the Department of
the Treasury, audited the accounts of the executive branch.2 ' Subsequently
Congress, recognizing that audit was incidental to the legislative power of
appropriation, transferred the function to the Comptroller General.' ,Mention
has already been made of the abolition of the maritime rate-making powers
enjoyed by the Secretary of Commerce between 1933 and 1936 and the solici-
tude of the President--evidenced in the language and explanation of Plan 21
-for Federal Maritime Board independence in the exercise of its regulatory
function.
A grant of these powers to the Department of Commerce would raise many
difficulties. One man is head and in virtually complete control of the De-
partment of Commerce. 3 The variety of personalities who have occupied that
post in recent years indicates a strong probability that there would have been
rapid and violent changes in transportation policy if that had been a Depart-
mental responsibility. What would have happened when Jesse Jones succeeded
Harry Hopkins? Or when Jones was turned out in favor of Henry A. Wal-
lace? Or when Charles Sawyer took over from XV. Averell Harriman? One
would never use the word monotonous in describing the succession of Secre-
taries of Commerce.
The Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation is intended by Plan
21 to be the Secretary's principal adviser on transportation. The occupants
of this post have been able and forceful men but also most varied in back-
ground, and the turnover has been rapid. The first appointee was General
Philip B. Fleming, who had had a distinguished career as a soldier and ad-
ministrator. His transportation experience had been exclusively maritime.24
He resigned because of ill health in May, 1951, after a little less than a year
reorganization of the Maritime Commission." Can the reason be that the earlier dele-
gation proved so unsatisfactory that it was promptly repealed by the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936? (49 STAT. 1985 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1946)).
19. 24 STAT. 3M-7, §§ 18, 21 (187).
20. 25 STAT. 855 (1889).
21. 28 STAT. 206 (1894).
22. Section 301, Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 42 ST.T. 23 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 41
(1946).
23. 64 STAT. 1263 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 note (Supp. 1952) (Reorganization
Plan No. 5 of 1950).
24. But even that vras slight.
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in office. He was succeeded by Delos W. Rentzel, who had served brilliantly
as Civil Aeronautics Administrator and Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board. Mr. Rentzel resigned in November, 1951, to accept a position in pri-
vate industry. The office was not filled until May, 1952. During the interim,
Philip A. Hollar, Deputy Under Secretary, advised the Secretary. Apart from
his government service, Mr. Hollar had been employed in the railroad and rail-
road equipment industries. Jack Garrett Scott became Under Secretary in
May, 1952. He is a lawyer and was general counsel to the National Associa-
tion of Bus Operators at the time of his appointment. Mr. Scott resigned in
January, 1953, because of the change in administration.
Although rigidity is not a desideratum in transportation policy, the uncer-
tainty that would thus have occurred had Dr. Huntington's plan been in effect
in recent years is likewise to be avoided. The organization of the ICC, con-
sisting as it does of eleven members with staggered terms of seven years,2
provides a large measure of stability with constant opportunity for the in-
jection of new thinking. The number of commissioners assures that every
decision will represent a composite of experience in a variety of associations
and endeavors.
An additional objection lies in the essentially political character of the
Secretary of Commerce and the Under Secretary for Transportation. They
cannot close their doors to ex parte callers nor insist that stenographic minutes
be taken of every conversation. Holding office at the pleasure of the Presi-
dent, they are subject to his orders, and he very properly is concerned with
getting votes. Pressures of this sort are much more remotely exerted on the
ICC, which, as Dr. Huntington correctly says, nevertheless requires political
support from some source. The good will of the President is an obvious pre-
requisite to appointment of the individual commissioners,20 and the Com-
mission as a whole requires congressional appropriations if it is to perform
its duties. These requirements mean that while the Commission cannot carry
on in an ivory tower, it does remain free of the demands made upon the
lieutenants of the President.
The transfer of regulatory powers to the Department of Commerce would
also be inconsistent with the transportation responsibilities of other agencies
25. 24 STAT. 383 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1946).
26. In view of the special interest of the Department of Commerce in transportation,
the President, as a matter of routine, might well look to the Secretary for investigation
and recommendation concerning appointments to the regulatory agencies, as he now looks
to the Attorney General with respect to judicial appointments. So far as the writer is
aware, the President has hitherto never done so with respect to the ICC, and only
occasionally as to the CAB and FMB (including its predecessors). In addition to pro-
viding an orderly procedure, such a practice would assure the Secretary a somewhat
greater voice in transportation policy in a manner consistent with the traditional separa-
tion of powers. A possible objection is that his influence would thereby become exces-
sive in view of the short terms of office of the members of the CAB and FMB (five and
four years, respectively). An obvious remedy, and it is a measure that deserves considera-
tion in any event, would be to lengthen those terms.
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of the executive branch. The Department of Agriculture is required to protect
the rates on agricultural products and is authorized for that purpose to appear
before regulatory agencies; the General Services Administration, and in some
instances the Department of Defense, have similar commissions on behalf of
government traffic; price control agencies have been allowed to intervene in
rate cases; the Department of justice from time to time finds its programs
involved; mail rate cases before the CAB are contested by the Departments
of the Post Office and of the Interior.2 7 Although there is probably no in-
herent reason why the Department of Commerce could not be authorized
to decide matters presented to it by other agencies of the executive branch.
the necessity for rejecting their contentions, at least on occasion, contains the
seeds of embarrassment. Certainly such an organizational scheme would not
be conducive to harmony.
Dr. Huntington cites an article by the Assistant Solicitor General, Robert
L. Stern,2 to show the present extent of legal controversy between the ICC and
other government agencies. But MIr. Stem also points out that when another
government agency differs from the Department of Justice in a court cae,
"determination by the judiciary is often more satisfactory than an effort by
the Department of Justice to force its own views on the disagreeing agency
by refusing to present the agency's position to the courts."!2- So both posi-
tions are presented and the court decides who is right. In the same way the
executive agencies with transportation responsibilities would presumably pre-
fer to take their chances with the ICC or other regulatory body rather than
assume the risk of an adverse determination by the Department of Commerce.
For the Secretary of Agriculture or the Attorney General to be publicl.
overruled by the Secretary of Commerce would be humiliating.:  (in the
other hand, cabinet officers accept more or less philosophically the rejection
of their views by the legislative and also the judicial branch.
Among the experts on the capacity of the Department of Commerce to
undertake the functions Dr. Huntington proposes to give it, must be included
the Secretary of Commerce and the Under Secretary for Transportation.
27. Agriculture: 52 STA T. 36 (1933), 7 U.S.C. § 1291(b) (1946); General Senrices
Administration and Department of Defense: 63 STAT. 31,3 (1949), 40 U.S.C. §431(a)
(4) (Supp. 1952); Office of Price Stabilization: Defense Prcduction Act, Title IV,
§ 402(d) (3) (v), 64 STAT. 806 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2102 (Supp. 1952) ; Post Office
and Interior: Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 406, 52 STAT. 993 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 48f
(1946) (Interior acts on behalf of Hawaii and Alaska, dealt with by subsection (e)). See
Huntington, pp. 486-7. Whether so many executive agencies should have transportation
responsibilities, and how active they should be, are controversial questions touched upon
in note 45 infra.
23. "Inconsistency" in Governmnt Litigation, 65 HARv. L. PRnv. 762 (1951), cited at
Huntington, p. 506 n.178.
29. Stern, supra note 28, at 769.
30. In fact so humiliating that the Secretary of Commerce would have t. be a marvel
of detachment to avoid being influenced by considerations of interdepartmental relations
and similar factors extraneous to the merits.
19531
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Dr. Morgan has cited Secretary Sawyer's dictum in a speech made in April,
1952 (the same month in which Dr. Huntington's article was published),
entitled "The Government's Role in Transportation." "Regulatory activity,"
the Secretary said, "should be exercised by independent agencies." 31 Secre-
tary Sawyer "assured" the Senate Committee on Appropriations "time and
again" that there was no "purpose" on the part of the Commerce Department
to "take over" regulatory functions.3 2 Under Secretary Scott gave assurances
to the same effect.- The Commerce Department order specifying the duties
of the Under Secretary for Transportation cautions: "No provision of this
order shall be construed as empowering or directing the Under Secretary for
Transportation to assume or perform regulatory functions or operating func-
tions in the field of transportation.
34
These are the most recent expressions on this subject by officers of the
Commerce Department.3 5 Their point of view is fortified by the absence of
any demand by former Secretaries of Commerce for regulatory functions. It
is of special interest that former President Hoover, who enjoyed the longest
tenure of any Secretary of Commerce and recently served as Chairman of the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
never proposed a transfer of the ICC's regulatory powers to the Commerce
Department. As Dr. Huntington indicates, Mr. Hoover's Commission was
neither unfriendly to the Commerce Department nor notably sympathetic to
the ICC. 6
Quite apart from these objections to Dr. Huntington's proposal is a con-
sideration which nowadays should receive increasing attention when govern-
mental organization is under discussion. The danger to democratic institu-
tions inherent in delegation of legislative power to the executive branch has
become all too apparent in the last two decades. The sweeping delegations by
the Reichstag to Chancellor Bruening paved the way for complete abdication
to Hitler. Generally speaking, the greater the powers of the executive branch,
the closer a government is to totalitarianism; the more active and critical the
legislative body, the freer is speech and thought. Without meaning to imply,
even remotely, that the transfer of the powers of the ICC to the Commerce
Department would mean fascism, one cannot deny an instinctive sentiment
that even the most minor accretion to executive power is to be avoided if at
all possible.
31. Quoted in Morgan, supra note 5, at 224.
32. Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Appropriations, Depart-
inents of State, Justice, and Commerce and the Judiciary, Appropriations for 1953, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1445 (1952).
33. Id. at 1443; Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
inerce on S. 2344, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1952).
34. 16 FED. REG. 8189-90 (1951). Dr. Huntington paraphrased a part of this order in
Huntington, pp. 469-70 n.9, but he omitted the provision quoted above.
35. At the time of writing, the administration of Secretary Weeks had made no public
statement on this subject.
36. Huntington, p. 475.
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The Proper Role of the Commerce Department in Transportation Regulation
To express fear of executive expansion, however, is not to suggest that the
present organization of transportation regulation is perfect. The writer's con-
clusion is, however, the reverse of Dr. Huntington's. The bodies which regu-
late shipping and aviation should, in the writer's opinion, be as free of any
Commerce Department connection as the ICC. That the Federal Maritime
Board is independent of the Secretary of Commerce in exercising regulatory
functions has already been mentioned. Nevertheless, the Department is so
actively engaged in maritime activities that the detachment essential to com-
plete independence is difficult. When the writer presented the views of the
Department to the Federal Iaritime Board at an open hearing in a rate case,
he could not escape the feeling that his arguments carried more weight than
was warranted by the combined force of their intrinsic logic and the prestige
inherent in any presentation by the executive branch.37 This intimacy between
the Board and the Department follows from the provisions of Plan 21 that
the Chairman of the Federal Maritime Board and the Maritime Administrator
be the same person (Section 202), and that the Board and the Adminibtra-
tion shall make joint use of personnel (Section 302), together with the pro-
vision that the Maritime Administration and its Administrator are to be
subordinate to the Secretary of Commerce (Sections 202 and 204). The
theories supporting Board-Administration affiliation are, according to the ex-
planatory message of the President, that "cooperation" will be facilitated and
that "many of the technical and professional personnel, such as ship designer.
and attorneys, now assist ... on problems of subsidy determination and also
participate in the subsequent administration of subsidy agreements and in
performing non-subsidy functions." 38 In this writer's observation the identi-
ties of office and personnel provided by Sections 202 and 302 tend to prevent
that independence in regulatory functions provided by other parts of the Plan.
As independence is of first importance, Sections 202 and 302 should be
repealed,39 as well as that provision of Section 106 by which the Board it
"an agency within the Department of Commerce."40
37. Yet, taking into account its responsibilities in the maritime field, the Department
cannot be expected alwavs to remain silent on important problems of maritime rilicy
coming before the FMB.
38. I.R. Doc. No. 526, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
39. Further, the burdens of Chairman of the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime
Administrator are too great for one man.
40. On the other hand, it is only fair to say that maritime affairs were conducted
in 1951 and 1952 with great efficiency and almost universal approval-the Comptroller
General sounding the only discordant note. The -writer attributes this success to factors
other than any dominance of the FIB by the Department of Commerce by virtue of
§§ 106, 202, and 302 of Plan 21 or otherwise. The FMB, headed by Vice-Admiral E. L
Cochrane, U.S.N. (ret.), who was also Maritime Administrator, was composed during
these years of men of the highest qualifications. The Secretary of CLmmerce admired
and respected them. The Under Secretaries for Transportation had little or no maritime
experience and were continually changing. It vas rather Admiral Cochrane and his asso-
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The Civil Aeronautics Board is already independent, but that independence
should be clarified. At present it is located on the fifth floor of the Com-
merce Building in Washington, the same floor with the Secretary and other
Department officers. The Commerce Department supervises so-called "house-
keeping" functions of the CAB. Presumably, these are the facts that have
created an impression that the Department has some kind of authority over
the Civil Aeronautics Board.41 The writer recommends that the Civil Aero-
nautics Board be given offices outside the Commerce Building and that its
housekeeping functions be performed separately from those of the Commerce
Department.
There is a useful role for the Department of Commerce in the formulation
of transportation policy although not in the exercise of regulatory powers,
The Department should be in the forefront in both drafting and analyzing
proposed legislation, and in making cogent and forceful presentations in the
more important cases before regulatory agencies. These types of activity have
already been undertaken. For instance, the Department submitted elaborate
and extensive comments on the so-called "Johnson bills," which were con-
sidered last year by the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce.42 These bills would have substantially revised the Interstate Corn-
ciates who supplied policy to the Secretary-although obviously not in the form of com-
mands-in both Board and Administration matters coming to his attention (with the ex-
ception of the Dollar Line settlement in which the Secretary took the lead). Although not
accepting the judgments of these officials blindly, the Secretary trusted and supported
them, and when occasion required, threw all his energy and the full weight of his office
behind them. These circumstances combined to create for the FMB an independence far
greater than would be the case if a Secretary, relying for advice on the Under Secretary
for Transportation in accordance with the philosophy of Plan 21, chose to press on the
FMB his views on regulation, subsidy, or other subjects. The writer doubts that the FMB
could withstand such pressure. The evil, of course, would lie not in the presentation of
his views by the Secretary, but in the possibility that the Board might not regard itself
as entirely free to reject them.
By way of comparison with the views expressed in the text above, it should be noted
that in informal discussions with the writer, Admiral Cochrane (now Dean of Engineer-
ing at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) said that his experience had led him
to conclude that the present arrangement should be retained. He believed that, the Mari-
time Administration rightly being in the Department of Commerce, the FMB should be
there too, because their tasks are so closely related. Despite his great regard for Admiral
Cochrane's acumen, the writer questions whether Admiral Cochrane's conclusion would
have been the same if he had found in the Secretary a commander, instead of a confidant
and champion, available when needed.
41. See comments of Senator Bridges at Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate
Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce and the Judi-
ciary, Appropriations for 1953, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1445 (1952). "Housekeeping" consists
of "budget, accounting, personnel, procurement and related routine management functions."
§ 7(c), Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1939, 53 STAT. 562 (1939), 5 U.S.C. § 139 (1940).
42. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Cotmnerce on Bills
relating to Domestic Land and Water Transportation, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The
writer's testimony on behalf of the Department appears id. at 39 and passim.
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merce Act. The Department itself regularly proposes transportation bills.
These. fairly technical in character, have originated in the bureaus, but it may
be anticipated that the Under Secretary for Transportation will soon submit
bills relating to over-all policy. The Department has participated in a number
of important cases before the regulatory agencies since the adoption of Plan
21 43 and might well be more active in the future. Congressional uncertainty
as to the wisdom of appearances by the Department before the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board has apparently been based on confusion concerning the relationship
between the two agencies. 44 But Congress regularly invites the Department to
express its views on transportation policies before leIslative committees. Thus,
Congress could hardly object if the Department made similar presentations to
the delegates of Congress: the regulatory agencies. In this way the executive
branch would be assured a proper status in transportation policy-a regular




This course would tend to fill another need in transportation regulation.
From time to time, sentiment has been expressed for an organization to har-
monize decisions of the ICC, FM1B, and CAB, and an enterprising gentleman
under the auspices of the United States Chamber of Commerce has already
drafted the organizational chart of a super-commission to accomplish this re-
43. Ex parte 175, 2S0 I.C.C. 179 (1951), 2S1 I.C.C. 557 (1951), 2-4 I.C.C. 5:9
(1952); The North Atlantic Certificate Reneztsal Case, decided by the CAP., March 27.,
1952, not yet officially reported: The Irregular Carrier Inzestiqation (CAB); The
United States-Atlantic-Middle East Air Cargo Case (CAB); General Order 76
(FIB); and The North Atlantic Conference Rates Case (FMB). The Department's
intervention in Ex parte 175 was not to express its views but to make available tv the
Commission the resources of its Office of Transportation and Office of BusineSs Eco-
nomics as a check on the data and estimates submitted by the railroads. The ICC placed
great reliance on the Department's evidence. 2$4 I.C.C. 55S9, t0 et seq., v22 et sq. Even
President Franklin of the Pennsylvania Railroad, a stem critic of guvernment interven-
tion in rate cases, conceded that the Department's estimates were "exceptionally ge~d:"
Hearings, spra note 42, at S93.
44. See note 41 supra.
45. Objection has been made, notably by Mr. Franklin, to ai'y appearance b,. gvern-
ment departments in ICC cases, principally on the ground that it is time-c:nsuming.
Apparently Dr. Morgan to some e-x'tent synpathizes with his objection. Morgan, srlfa
note 5, at 211-12. There has undoubtedly ben duplication of effort and waste oi time
in such appearances, although these evils were finally corrected in so elaiorate a pro-
ceeding as Ex parte 175, 284 I.C.C. 589 (1952). See the Commission's comment, id. at
627-8. Whatever the pros and cons of these abuses, and they are not unavoidable, the
proposition can hardly be seriously maintained that if the executive branch wants to
present some evidence or argument to a regulatory agency in an open hearin- and in
accordance with the agency's rules of procedure, it should not be permitted to do so.
And in view of the importance of transportation, interventions by the coxccutile branch
are to be expected occasionally. The frequency of such occains mut I left t," th,
sound discretion of the executive branch. As already menti.,ned, a ,Varalk.v ly tlw
Department of Commerce before the FIB raise a different problem, which wuld I
solved by breaking the links between them.
1953]
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sult.46 But one trembles at the thought of another bureaucracy. The Depart-
ment of Commerce is perhaps the only organization, public or private, that has
occasion to appear with some frequency before all three of these agencies in
important policy cases. The Department might well, whenever relevant, call to
the attention of each body the principles and concepts adopted by the others.
In this way there would be exerted a certain pressure in favor of consistency.
This is probably as far as it is desirable to go. There is such a thing as too
much consistency. If, and this is only an assumption, the agencies should
persist in irreconcilable attitudes not warranted by the differences in the in-
dustries subject to their regulation, Congress may be expected to provide
relief.
In conclusion, then, the transfer to the Department of Commerce of the
regulatory powers of the ICC must be rejected. Whatever the vices of the
present arrangement, such a transfer would unnecessarily violate the concept
of the separation of powers and would bestow authority on an agency with-
out experience in or qualification for its exercise. The very proper interest
of the executive branch in transportation policy can best be expressed by
persuasive presentations by the Department to Congress and to the regulatory
agencies.
46. Traffic World, Dec. 22, 1951, p. 24.
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